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Abstract
Positive and negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation are dis-
cussed. As positive features can be mentioned its pragmatism and its aware-
ness of the crucial role of measurement. However, the main part of the con-
tribution is devoted to the negative features, to wit, its pragmatism (once
again), its confounding of preparation and measurement, its classical account
of measurement, its completeness claims, the ambiguity of its notion of cor-
respondence, its confused notion of complementarity. It is demonstrated how
confusions and paradoxes stemming from the negative features of the Copen-
hagen interpretation can be dealt with in an amended interpretation, to be
referred to as ‘neo-Copenhagen interpretation’, in which the role of the mea-
suring instrument is taken seriously by recognizing the quantum mechanical
character of its interaction with the microscopic object. The ensuing neces-
sity of extending the notion of a quantum mechanical observable from the
Hermitian operator of the standard formalism to the positive operator-valued
measure of a generalized formalism is demonstrated to yield a sound math-
ematical basis for a transition from the Copenhagen contextualistic-realist
interpretation to the neo-Copenhagen empiricist one. Applications to the
uncertainty relations and to the Bell inequalities are briefly discussed.
1 Introduction
Interpretations of physical theories are neither true nor false. Even if they are not
completely internally consistent they may be thought to provide useful rules of cor-
respondence between the mathematical formalism and the physical reality a theory
purports to describe. It is well-known that the Copenhagen interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics is no exception. Even 80 years after its conception it is impossible to
say that there exists a unique and internally consistent interpretation by that name.
On the contrary, this interpretation has been characterized (Feyerabend [1]) as “not
a single idea but a mixed bag of interesting conjectures, dogmatic declarations, and
philosophical absurdities.”
In my contribution to a ‘conference devoted to 80 years of Copenhagen Inter-
pretation’ it therefore is not possible to present a eulogy. On the contrary, my
main attention will be directed toward the many imperfections of the Copenhagen
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interpretation. Among these I do not count the pragmatic attitude the founding
fathers of quantum mechanics have displayed while developing the theory so as to
be able to come to grips with the “strange” results their experiments confronted
them with. On the contrary, at that time a pragmatic approach, not bothering
too much about the physical meaning of the applied mathematics, turned out to
be advantageous to rapid scientific progress. However, maintaining such a pragma-
tism for 80 years may have become detrimental both with respect to development
of fundamental insights as well as experimental applications. As seen from table
1 the list of negative features is considerably longer than that of the Copenhagen
interpretation’s positive features. Thus, we have to deal with the Copenhagen pre-
Positive features Negative features
+1. pragmatism -1. pragmatism
+2. crucial role of measurement -2. confusion of preparation and measurement
-3. classical account of measurement
-4. completeness claims
-5. ambiguous notion of correspondence
-6. confused notion of complementarity
Table 1: Positive and negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation
occupation with measurement, having as a consequence a confusion of preparation
and measurement. Another negative feature is the classical account of measurement,
overlooking a crucial property of measurements performed on microscopic objects by
means of macroscopic measuring instruments. Moreover, each of the three charac-
teristics of the Copenhagen interpretation, viz. completeness, correspondence, and
complementarity, is liable to criticism and will be criticized.
Any of these issues might be sufficient to reject the Copenhagen interpretation
as a useful interpretation of quantum mechanics. Yet, there is one important posi-
tive feature in the Copenhagen appreciation of quantum mechanics as a description
of microscopic reality, viz. its recognition of the crucial role played by measure-
ment, which probably outweighs its imperfections. This feature, often considered
a weakness of the interpretation, is actually an asset, making quantum mechanics
different from classical theory in a truly revolutionary way. It makes quantum me-
chanics a paradigm of the structuralist methodology (e.g. Suppe [2]) in which the
Einsteinian idea of a physical theory as a ‘description of an objective reality (i.e.
being independent of the observer, including his measuring instruments)’ has been
relinquished.
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2 The Copenhagen interpretation and measure-
ment
2.1 Crucial role of measurement
Classical mechanics is generally presented as representing knowledge about an objec-
tive reality, i.e., a reality as it is independently of being observed by human observers,
and, in particular, not being interfered with by their measuring instruments. The
impossibility of an interpretation of quantum mechanics as an objective description
of reality was a main reason for Einstein to disqualify quantum mechanics as not
being an adequate physical theory. On the other hand, Bohr was deeply convinced
that the existence of a non-vanishing quantum of action h 6= 0 entailed a fundamen-
tal impossibility of such objective knowledge: only knowledge could be obtained
about ‘microscopic reality as it is in interaction with a measuring instrument ’, i.e.,
contextual knowledge (cf. section 4). The Heisenberg uncertainty relations were
considered as evidence of this, the quantized interaction of an object with different
measuring instruments (of incompatible observables) being held responsible for the
impossibility of obtaining simultaneously sharp knowledge about e.g. position and
momentum.
According to Bohr and Heisenberg quantum mechanics did not represent any
objective knowledge, and it did not need to do so because such knowledge would
not be verifiable. It should nevertheless be stressed here that the discussion between
Bohr and Einstein was not over the question of verifiability, but over the question
of whether it is possible to obtain knowledge about a microscopic object without
in any way interacting with it [3], i.e. whether quantum mechanics can yield an
objective description (Einstein), or whether we should content ourselves with a con-
textual one (Bohr). Only after many years we have gradually become convinced
(e.g., by the Kochen-Specker [4] and the Bell [5] theorems) that it is impossible to
attribute sharp values to quantum mechanical observables as objective properties
possessed by a microscopic object independently of any measurement. Bohr’s con-
textualism, to the effect that quantum mechanical observables are well-defined only
within the context of a measurement serving to measure that very observable, can
be seen as an indication that physical theories do not have the absolute property
of being either universally true or universally false, but that they are applicable on
a certain domain of experimentation, for quantum mechanics its domain of validity
being co-determined by the measurement arrangement. The Copenhagen insight
that measurement plays an ineradicable role in the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics is a fundamental epistemological attainment, in a more general form finding
application far beyond quantum mechanics and even physics.
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Figure 1: Preparation and measurement.
2.2 Confusion of preparation and measurement
However, the Copenhagen preoccupation with measurement has its drawback. As a
consequence of the emphasis put on ‘measurement’, there was a tendency to formu-
late all physical operations in terms of this particular one. Measurement was seen
where there is none. Thus, in Heisenberg’s version of the Copenhagen interpretation
a measurement result actually corresponds to a property of the microscopic object
in its final state (Heisenberg [6]). Consider, for instance, the Stern-Gerlach exper-
iment. Here, an atom with non-vanishing angular momentum, after traversing an
inhomogeneous magnetic field may finally be found in one of a number of different
beams (cf. figure 1). Finding the atom in a beam is interpreted as a determina-
tion of the value of a component of the atom’s angular momentum. It is important
to note here that for performing such a measurement it is essential that detectors
are set up in the beams. Without these detectors the experimental arrangement
does not correspond to a measurement but to a conditional preparation (e.g. de
Muynck [7], section 3.2.6 and 3.3.4), allowing to perform a measurement of an arbi-
trary observable conditional on the beam (state |ψm〉) the atom happens to be in.
Unfortunately, following Heisenberg [6] the Stern-Gerlach arrangement is generally
interpreted as a measurement also if no detectors are present (sometimes referred to
as a ‘preparative measurement’), thus allowing the experiment to satisfy (be it only
approximately) the von Neumann projection postulate, stating that the condition-
ally prepared state |ψm〉 equals the eigenstate |am〉 corresponding to the eigenvalue
that allegedly would have been found if the measurement had been performed by
inserting a detector. It is rather evident that if von Neumann’s postulate holds if
the detector is absent, its presence will in general change the state appreciably, thus
showing the absurdity of the projection postulate as a measurement principle.
As an example of the confusion of preparation and measurement should be men-
tioned here the EPR setup (figure 2a), presented in [3] as a measurement of a prop-
erty of particle 2 (without in any way interacting with that particle). Unfortunately,
Bohr accepted the EPR proposal as such, even though it is not really a measurement
of particle 2 but rather a preparation of that particle. The EPR setup should be
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compared with an EPR-Bell experiment (figure 2b), like the ones performed by As-
pect and co-workers [8] to test the Bell inequalities by means of a joint measurement
on both particles. Unfortunately, experiments of the EPR-Bell type are generally
referred to as EPR experiments, thus veiling the fundamental difference of these
experiments.
2.3 Bohr’s classical account of measurement
The stress laid by Bohr on the macroscopicity of measuring instruments, and the
necessity to account for the results of measurement in classical terms (cf. section 4)
is well-known and need not be discussed here. It should be emphasized, however,
that by thus restricting the attention exclusively to the macroscopic part of the mea-
surement it was neglected that a measurement performed on a microscopic object
must also have a microscopic part, viz. a part that is sensitive to the microscopic
information, so as to be able to realize information transfer from the microscopic ob-
ject to the measuring instrument. For instance, in the Stern-Gerlach experiment the
initial phase of the measurement (nowadays generally called the ‘pre-measurement’)
in which the atom interacts with a magnetic field so as to slightly influence the
atom’s position, is a microscopic process which should be described quantum me-
chanically rather than classically. In the amplification phase of the measurement
the atom’s position can be thought to change classically so as to create a sufficient
distance between the beams to distinguish one from the other. It therefore seems
that the microscopic rather than the macroscopic part of the measurement is the
interesting one. Bohr’s exclusive attention to the macroscopic part has not con-
tributed to achieving this insight, to say the least. In particular, the development
of the generalized formalism is a consequence of a rigorous application of quantum
mechanics to the interaction of the microscopic object and the measuring instrument
(cf. section 3.2).
It should be noted that von Neumann and Heisenberg did consider a quantum
mechanical description of measurement. However, they did not challenge Bohr’s
1 2
1 2
a )
b )
Figure 2: a) EPR experiment; b) EPR-Bell experiment.
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classical description; their purpose was only to prove that a quantum mechanical
description of measurement is compatible with Bohr’s classical one. In particular,
reliance on the projection postulate c.q. restriction to measurements approximately
satisfying it, was responsible for the fruitlessness of these by itself praiseworthy
undertakings.
3 (In)completeness of quantum mechanics
3.1 (In)completeness in a wider sense
Two senses of ‘(in)completeness of quantum mechanics’ should be distinguished, viz.
‘(in)completeness in a wider sense’, dealing with the question of ‘whether hidden
variables are possible’, and ‘(in)completeness in a restricted sense’, addressing the
question of ‘whether the standard formalism of quantum mechanics describes all
possible measurements within the domain of quantum mechanics’. In the past the
main interest has been attracted by the first issue. I will not go into this, but want to
restrict myself to demonstrating the relative futility of the discussion by comparing
the answer given by Copenhagen physicists A.D. 1935 (viz. “Quantum mechanics is
complete; there are no hidden variables”) to the answer most practicing physicists
would probably give A.D. 2007 (viz. “Quantum mechanics is incomplete; ‘no go’
theorems of hidden variables theories were found to be defective, possibly at the
expense of introducing nonlocality (Bohm, Bell)”).
Contrary to the Copenhagen idea that the wave function yields a complete de-
scription of an individual object, it seems nowadays to be generally recognized that
the wave function does rather describe an ensemble. This insight has been gained by
careful analysis of interference experiments at low incident particle rates in which
impacts of individual particles can be registered. From these experiments it can be
inferred that what is described by the wave function (i.e. the interference pattern)
is not generated by an individual particle but by an ensemble of such particles.
The Copenhagen idea that the wave function would be a complete description of an
individual object does seem to be obsolete by now.
Does this mean that Einstein was right when attempting in the EPR paper [3]
to prove the incompleteness of quantum mechanics? Not completely so. Actually,
Einstein was bound to fail to do so because he attempted to prove the existence of
hidden variables by identifying these with ‘values of quantum mechanical observ-
ables’. The impossibility of this was rigorously demonstrated, only much later, by
Kochen and Specker’s proof [4] of the theorem named after them. However, this
does not exclude the possibility of subquantum theories involving hidden variables
of a different kind. In any case does it seem to be evident that within any theory
aspiring at a description of ‘reality behind the quantum mechanical phenomena’ the
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Figure 3: Which-way polarization measurement of a photon.
contextuality, noticed for the first time by Bohr and rejected by Einstein, will have
to be taken into account.
3.2 (In)completeness in a restricted sense
Whereas at this moment the question of ‘(in)completeness in a wider sense’ is not
experimentally relevant because we do not have any indication which kind of ex-
periments should be performed so as to transcend the quantum mechanical de-
scription in an observationally relevant way, the situation is different as regards
‘(in)completeness in a restricted sense’, at least if we restrict ourselves to the stan-
dard (textbook) formalism of that theory (in which measurement probabilities of
quantum mechanical observables are represented by expectation values of the pro-
jection operators of the spectral representations of Hermitian operators). The stan-
dard formalism is easily seen to be ‘incomplete in a restricted sense’. For instance,
consider the ‘which-way polarization measurement of a photon’ depicted in fig-
ure 3. Here a photon has probability γ to be transmitted by a nonpolarizing
semi-transparant mirror toward a polarization measurement setup in direction θ,
and probability 1 − γ to be reflected toward a polarization measurement setup in
direction θ′. Since the detection probabilities of detectors D and D′ are given by
pD = γ〈E
θ
+〉 and pD′ = (1−γ)〈E
θ′
+ 〉, respectively, E
θ
+ and E
θ′
+ being projection oper-
ators, it is evident that the detection probabilities are not described by the standard
formalism (e.g. γEθ+ 6= (γE
θ
+)
2). From the whole range 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 of possibilities of
the present experiment only the ‘set of measure zero γ = (0, 1)’ satisfies the standard
formalism.
This example can be supplemented by many other ones; actually, there are very
few realistic experiments satisfying the standard formalism (see e.g. de Muynck
[7]). If it is taken into account that the interaction of object and measuring in-
strument is a quantum mechanical process (cf. section 2.3), detection probabilities
are seen to be expectation values of the operators Mm of a positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) corresponding to the resolution of the identity {Mm}, Mm ≥
O,
∑
mMm = I, rather than a projection-valued measure (PVM) corresponding to
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the orthogonal decomposition {Em}, E
2
m = Em,
∑
mEm = I of the standard for-
malism. Indeed, denoting by ρo and ρa the initial density operators of microscopic
object and measuring instrument, respectively, the final density operator is given
by ρoaf = UρoρaU
†, U = e−
i
~
HT , T the interaction time. Then detection probabil-
ities of the pointer positions (represented by a pointer observable having spectral
representation {Eam}) are given by
pm = TroaρaofEam = TrρoMm, Mm = TraρaU
†EamU.
From the physical properties of the distribution {pm} it follows that the operators
Mm satisfy all properties of the elements of a POVM defined above. It should be
noted that there is no single reason to require idempotency of these operators.
4 The correspondence principle (mature form)
Disregarding here Bohr’s early use of the correspondence principle (in the sense of
requiring a classical limit for defining the notion of a quantum mechanical observ-
able), I want to restrict myself here to his later characterization, according to which
the following requirements should be met:
1. A quantum mechanical observable is exclusively defined within the context of
the measurement serving to measure that observable.
2. Experimental arrangement and measurement results have to be described in
classical terms.
Usually these requirements are considered part of the complementarity principle,
while restricting the notion of ‘correspondence’ to the requirement of a classical
limit. It, however, seems more appropriate to stick to Bohr’s later use, and restrict
‘complementarity’ to considerations on pairs of ‘complementary observables’ only
(cf. section 5).
The importance of the first item has been stressed already in section 2.1, whereas
the second item was criticized in section 2.3. It is my intention in the present section
to demonstrate that by not consistently sticking to the first item Bohr introduced
an ambiguity in his notion of ‘correspondence’, thus being responsible for much
confusion. The cause of this ambiguity can be traced back to not distinguishing
between two different possibilities of what is meant by the word ‘phenomenon’, viz.
either ‘a macroscopically observable property of a microscopic object’, or rather ‘a
property of a macroscopic measuring instrument obtained by letting the instrument
interact with the object (e.g. a pointer triggered by the microscopic object to take
a certain position on a measurement scale)’. From the way Bohr reacted to the
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EPR proposal [3] it is evident that he had in mind the first possibility. Indeed,
since no measuring instrument is present for particle 2 (cf. figure 2a) Bohr could
accept Einstein’s proposal to view the EPR measurement setup as a measurement
on particle 2 only if the measurement result would be taken as a property of that
particle.
As a consequence of this Bohr applied his correspondence principle to EPR in
an inconsistent way. As a matter of fact, Bohr did not recognize the correlation
of two quantum mechanical observables A1 and A2, proposed in the EPR paper as
a classical correlation (Ai either position or momentum of particle i, i = 1, 2), as
an ordinary quantum mechanical observable. He granted Einstein well-definedness
of correlation observable A1A2 although only A1 is measured in the EPR exper-
iment. But, according to his correspondence principle the correlation observable
A1A2 is well-defined only in an EPR-Bell experiment. Hence, Bohr’s conclusion
that Einstein’s ‘element of physical reality’ is ambiguous (due to its dependence
on the context of the measurement of either P1 or Q1) must be completed by the
observation that Bohr’s conclusion is itself a consequence of an ambiguity as re-
gards the meaning of a quantum mechanical observable. Actually, like Einstein,
also Bohr never considered the possibility of looking upon a quantum mechanical
measurement result as a pointer position rather than as a property of the microscopic
object. Only by noting the difference between EPR experiments and experiments of
the EPR-Bell type (cf. figure 2) the inconsistency of Bohr’s reaction to EPR could
become obvious.
Unfortunately, negligence of the difference between EPR and EPR-Bell experi-
ments has been perpetuated until the present day. As a consequence it is still widely
thought that properties of particle 2 may be nonlocally influenced by the measure-
ment performed on particle 1. It will be seen in section 6 that there is no reason
for such a conclusion if quantum mechanical measurement results are assumed to
correspond to pointer positions of a measuring instrument.
In order to evade confusions like the one discussed here it is necessary to be as
precise as possible with respect to the correspondence between the mathematical
formalism of quantum mechanics and physical reality. For this reason two different
notions of ‘correspondence’ should be distinguished here, viz. (restricting ourselves
to standard observables)
1. Realist correspondence:
Quantum mechanical observable A, as well as its values am refer to properties
of the microscopic object.
2. Empiricist correspondence:
Quantum mechanical observable A is a label of a measurement procedure, am
is a label of a pointer position.
9
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Figure 4: Realist (a) and empiricist (b) interpretations of the mathematical formalism of
quantum mechanics.
More generally, we should distinguish two different interpretations of the mathemat-
ical formalism of quantum mechanics, viz. a realist interpretation (either objectivis-
tic or contextualistic) interpretation (cf. figure 4(a)) in which quantum mechanics
is thought to describe microscopic reality most in the same way classical mechanics
is generally thought to describe macroscopic reality, and an empiricist interpreta-
tion (cf. figure 4(b)) in which state vector and density operator are thought to
correspond to preparation procedures, and quantum mechanical observables (either
standard or generalized) correspond to measurement procedures and the phenom-
ena induced by a microscopic object in the macroscopically observable pointer of a
measuring instrument.
The empiricist interpretation is particularly suited to encompass the generaliza-
tion from the standard notion of a quantum mechanical observable to the generalized
one referred to in section 3.2. An important application of the empiricist interpreta-
tion to the generalized formalism is that POVMs can often be interpreted as labeling
nonideal measurement procedures, not registering ‘reality as it objectively is’, but
taking into account possible disturbing influences introduced by the measurement
itself. Thus, of two measurement procedures labeled by POVMs {Mm} and {Nn},
respectively, such that
Mm =
∑
n
λmnNn, λmn ≥ 0,
∑
m
λmn = 1, (1)
the first is a nonideal version of the second, the nonideality matrix (λmn) representing
the conditional probability that a measurement of POVM {Mm} yields result m if
a measurement of POVM {Nn} would have given result n. In the following sections
applications of this will be discussed. Restricting ourselves to discrete spectra it is
possible to quantify the nonideality by means of certain properties of the nonideality
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matrix. A convenient quantity is the average row entropy
J(λ) = −
1
N
∑
mn
λmn ln
λmn∑
n′ λmn′
. (2)
5 The complementarity principle
The complementarity principle must be seen as a ‘no go’ theorem as regards gen-
eral applicability of ‘correspondence as obtains in classical physics’: it was soon
established that the notion of ‘correspondence’ as defined in section 4 cannot be
applied simultaneously to quantum mechanical position and momentum observ-
ables, or, more generally, to incompatible standard observables (corresponding to
non-commuting Hermitian operators). From discussions of the so-called ‘thought
experiments’ it was seen that measurements of incompatible standard observables
had mutually exclusive measurement arrangements, in such a way that measure-
ment of one observable would disturb incompatible ones. The mutual disturbance
of measurement results of standard observables, when measured simultaneously, was
thought to be described by the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
∆A∆B ≥
1
2
|〈ψ|[A,B]−|ψ〉| (3)
derived from the standard formalism.
It is important here to remind a criticism by Ballentine [10], to the effect that the
Heisenberg uncertainty relation (3) does not refer to ‘joint measurement’ because
it can be tested by means of separate ideal measurements of observables A and B.
Hence, it is impossible that this inequality is an expression of mutual disturbance as
found in the ‘thought experiments’; it should be seen as a restriction of our preparing
abilities rather than of our measuring ones. Probably Einstein was closer to the real
meaning of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation (viz., as a restriction on the values
of standard deviations in an ensemble) than were Bohr and Heisenberg, who seem to
have been jumping to conclusions by associating the results of their considerations
on the ‘thought experiments’ with equation (3).
Perhaps Bohr and Heisenberg should not be blamed too much for this error
because they did not have at their disposal the generalized formalism referred to
in section 3.2, which turns out to be necessary to clarify the situation. It, indeed,
is possible by means of the POVMs of the generalized formalism to prove that
in trying to jointly measure incompatible standard observables mutual disturbance
necessarily occurs (Martens, de Muynck [11]; also de Muynck [7], section 7.10), thus
corroborating the results obtained by Bohr and Heisenberg by studying ‘thought
experiments’.
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In order to do so a bivariate POVM {Rmn} was considered, the expectation values
of which describing the joint probability distributions of the two pointers intended to
yield the measurement results of the incompatible observables A =
∑
m amEm and
B =
∑
n bnFn to be measured jointly. Then these latter probability distributions
are given by the expectation values of the marginals {
∑
nRmn} and {
∑
mRmn},
respectively. We will call a measurement procedure a joint measurement of A and
B if
∑
nRmn = Em and
∑
mRmn = Fn. It is not difficult to prove that this is
possible only if A and B are compatible. However, if A and B are incompatible it
is possible that the marginals of {Rmn} correspond to nonideal measurements (cf.
(1)) of A and B, respectively. Thus, the POVM {Rmn} describes a joint nonideal
measurement of standard observables A and B if nonideality matrices (λmm′) and
(µnn′) exist such that
∑
nRmn =
∑
m′ λmm′Em′ , λmm′ ≥ 0,
∑
m λmm′ = 1,∑
mRmn =
∑
n′ µnn′Fn′, µnn′ ≥ 0,
∑
n µnn′ = 1.
(4)
It is easily seen that measurement procedures exist satisfying (4). Thus, the mea-
surement arrangement depicted in figure 3 is a joint nonideal measurement of in-
compatible standard polarization observables in directions θ and θ′, respectively.
Indicating a detection event by +, and non-detection by −, we find
(Rmn) =
(
O γEθ+
(1− γ)Eθ
′
+ I − γE
θ
+ − (1− γ)E
θ′
+
)
, (5)
event ‘ + +′ having probability zero, and I − γEθ+ − (1 − γ)E
θ′
+ corresponding to
the possibility that the photon is not detected by either one of the detectors D or
D′ but is absorbed in one of the analyzers. It is straightforward to calculate the
nonideality matrices for this experiment as
(λmm′) =
(
γ 0
1− γ 1
)
, (µnn′) =
(
1− γ 0
γ 1
)
. (6)
From (6) it is easily seen how the mutual disturbance of the measurement results of
the two standard observables changes if the parameter γ is changed. In particular,
complementary behaviour is evident, deviation of one nonideality matrix from the
unit matrix being maximal whenever the other’s is minimal. This can be expressed
by means of the nonideality measure (2). For measurements of the type described by
(4) it is possible (Martens, de Muynck [11]) to derive the following general inequality,
J(λ) + J(µ) ≥ − ln{max
mn
TrEmFn}, (7)
to be referred to as the Martens inequality. It is important to note that, contrary
to the Heisenberg inequality (3), the Martens inequality does not depend on the
state vector or density operator but in an unambiguous way is a property of the
12
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Figure 5: Parametric plot of J(λ) versus J(µ) as a function of γ. The shaded area is
forbidden by the Martens inequality (7).
measurement procedure only. From an application of (7) to the joint nonideal mea-
surement of polarization observables depicted in figure 5 it is seen that the Martens
inequality yields a perfect illustration of the results obtained by Bohr and Heisen-
berg when studying the ‘thought experiments’. Indeed, their physical observations
based on these experiments were completely correct; only their reluctance to exert a
full-blown quantum mechanical analysis of the measurement process prevented them
from a sufficiently complete analysis.
It, incidentally, should be noticed that the mutual disturbance considered here
does refer to the final pointer positions of the measuring instruments. This should
be distinguished from ‘mutual disturbance in a preparative sense’ as discussed in the
Copenhagen literature, referring to the final state of the microscopic object rather
than to the final state of the measuring instrument. Actually, complementarity can
manifest itself in two different ways, viz., as a property of ‘preparation’ described
by the Heisenberg inequality, and as a property of ‘joint measurement’ described by
the Martens inequality. To a large extent the Copenhagen confusion with respect
to ‘complementarity’ has its origin in the confusion with respect to preparation and
measurement noted in section 2.2.
6 The Bell inequalities and nonlocality
As is well-known the Bell inequalities are satisfied if all standard observables that are
involved are mutually compatible. This entails the conclusion that incompatibility
is a necessary condition for the Bell inequalities to be violated. But, due to the
‘postulate of local commutativity’ (stating that observables measured in causally
13
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Figure 6: Generalized EPR-Bell experiment.
disconnected regions of space-time must be compatible) incompatibility of observ-
ables is a local affair. Hence, violation of the Bell inequalities must have a local
origin. It is the intention of the present section to demonstrate that, indeed, vio-
lation of the Bell inequalities may be caused by local mutual disturbance in joint
nonideal measurements of incompatible standard observables rather than by nonlo-
cal influences.
In order to do so we consider the generalized EPR-Bell experiment depicted
in figure 6, the difference with the Aspect experiments [8] being that the mirrors
indicated by γ1 and γ2 are ‘semi-transparant, and stationary’ rather than ‘completely
reflecting, and either stationary or switching’. We consider here two measurements
of the type depicted in figure 3, simultaneously performed on particles 1 and 2. The
Aspect experiments are special cases of the present experiment, satisfying (γ1, γ2) =
(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0), respectively. For general (γ1, γ2) the (quadrivariate)
POVM {Rm1n1m2n2} follows directly from the bivariate POVM (5) as
R(γ1γ2)m1n1m2n2 = R
(γ1)
m1n1
R(γ2)m2n2, (8)
in which the parameters γ1 and γ2 are added to distinguish the two arms of the
interferometer. The expectation value of POVM (8) yields the quadrivariate prob-
ability distribution of a joint nonideal measurement of four standard polarization
observables in directions θ1, θ
′
1, θ2, and θ
′
2, respectively. There is mutual disturbance
of the type discussed in section 5 separately in each of the arms of the interferometer.
As is to be expected from the postulate of local commutativity there is no mutual
disturbance between different arms of the interferometer.
Let us finally see where the violation of the Bell inequalities in the Aspect ex-
periments [8] comes from (see de Muynck [7], chapter 9). In order to do so it is
important to note that these experiments can be demonstrated to violate the Bell
inequalities only by combining results obtained within four different arrangements
for measuring bivariate probabilities. By contrast, the bivariate probabilities derived
from the generalized experiment for fixed (γ1, γ2) from the experimentally obtained
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quadrivariate one do satisfy the Bell inequalities because they are obtained within
one single measurement setup. This can be traced back to the fact that each individ-
ual particle pair yields a quadruple (m1, n1, m2, n2) of measurement results (pointer
readings); this is a sufficient condition for the statistics to have a Kolmogorovian
character. This evidently holds true for each of the Aspect experiments separately,
but not for measurement results of the four experiments pasted together.
Violation of the Bell inequalities is evidence of the non-Kolmogorovian char-
acter of the statistics. Indeed, by changing the measurement arrangement in the
experiments performed by Aspect the quadruples are changed in such a way that an
octuple of measurement results of the four measurements corresponding to (γ1, γ2) =
(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0), cannot be accommodated into one single quadruple.
The cause of this is seen to be a changing of the mutual disturbance in one arm
of the interferometer by changing the measurement arrangement in that arm (and
analogously in the other arm). These changes are completely accounted for by the
the idea of complementarity in a joint measurement of incompatible standard ob-
servables as discussed in section 5. Nonlocal influences between different arms are
not necessary to explain the ensuing violation of the Bell inequalities.
It should finally be stressed that the latter conclusion, although derived from
(generalized) quantum mechanics, is actually a conclusion about the physical pro-
cesses obtaining in experiments of the kind discussed here. Therefore, the often-
heard assertion that quantum mechanical locality might be compatible with sub-
quantum nonlocality (the latter, allegedly, being necessary to cope with derivations
of the Bell inequalities from local hidden variables theories), is not applicable: it
is utterly unreasonable to suppose that one and the same phenomenon would have
completely different physical explanations within different theories. If violation of
the Bell inequalities has a local explanation within a quantum mechanical description
of certain phenomena, it should have a local explanation within any theory describ-
ing the reality behind these phenomena. Rather than acquiescing in an unfortunate
marriage of ‘observable locality’ with ‘unobservable nonlocality’ by relying on such
fancy expressions like ‘entanglement’, ‘inseparability’ or ‘passion at a distance’, it
seems more appropriate to perform as precise as possible analyses of measurement
processes, and to study the relations between its measurement results and the prop-
erties of microscopic objects as described in different theories.
7 From Copenhagen to neo-Copenhagen interpre-
tation (summary)
Due to Bohr’s reference to ‘phenomena’ the Copenhagen interpretation has an em-
piricist reputation (e.g. Reichenbach [12]). However, on closer scrutiny Bohr’s ‘phe-
nomenon’ is probably too much inspired by the rather primitive detection methods
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(like flashes on a scintillation screen) of that time. It does not take into account
more modern measurement procedures in which the final observational data are
processed so as to be only vaguely reminiscent of their microscopic origin: what is
seen by the observer is often just a graph coming out of his printer. Contrary to
the Copenhagen interpretation (which, for the main part, is a realist interpretation,
be it of a contextualistic kind) the neo-Copenhagen interpretation is an empiricist
one, adapted to the generalized formalism of quantum mechanics necessary to also
describe more modern experiments (cf. de Muynck [7], chapter 8).
Comparing, in summary, the neo-Copenhagen interpretation with the Copen-
hagen one with respect to the notions of completeness, correspondence and comple-
mentarity, we arrive at the following results:
interpretation: Copenhagen neo-Copenhagen
completeness:
in a wider sense: yes (claimed) no
in a restricted sense (standard qm): yes (claimed) no
in a restricted sense (generalized qm): yes
correspondence: contextualistic-realist empiricist
partly classical completely qm
complementarity:
preparation: Heisenberg inequality
joint measurement: Heisenberg inequality Martens inequality
Notwithstanding the considerable differences does it nevertheless seem appropri-
ate to pay a tribute to Copenhagen by referring to that name in the new interpreta-
tion, because in the latter the important development away from the classical idea
of ‘physical theory as an objective description of reality’, which was started by the
Copenhagen interpretation, has been continued, and has been pushed to a logical
completion.
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